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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Petitioner, 
v. 
DANIEL J. PETERSON, 
Defendant/Respondent. 
Case No. 20030802-SC 
REPLY BRIEF OF PETITIONER 
REPLY TO POINT 1(A) OF DEFENDANT'S BRIEF: THE SAME 
SAFETY CONCERN THAT DRIVES THE RESULT IN MICHIGAN 
V. LONG EXISTS HERE—THE FEAR THAT A LAWFULLY 
DETAINED SUSPECT MAY GAIN ACCESS TO A WEAPON 
In Point 1(A) of his brief, defendant argues that the State's reliance on Michigan v. 
Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983), and progeny is misplaced. According to defendant, Long's 
extension of the weapons frisk doctrine of Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), to vehicle 
passenger compartments is "not analogous to the facts of this case" because Officer 
Billings "was not concerned for his safety regarding the coat unless—or until—the coat 
was handed to [defendant] outside the residence." Resp. Br. at 10 (citing R210:22). 
Defendant's attempt to distinguish Long, however, only serves to reinforce the 
State's argument. Long and its progeny are relevant here precisely because the same 
safety concerns that justify police in checking a vehicle passenger compartment for 
weapons before allowing a suspect to reenter allow an officer to check a dangerous 
suspect's clothing before handing it to him during a lawful detention out-of-doors in 
"twenty degree weather." R210: 37, 53-54. See Long, 463 U.S. at 1051-1052. Given the 
extreme weather and defendant's lack of proper clothing, it was only a matter of time 
until defendant would be provided the coat and shoes he earlier discarded in the baby's 
bedroom. Thus, as set out in the State's opening brief, the court of appeals' decision, if 
left intact, unjustifiably forces police officers to choose between leaving a lawfully 
detained suspect outside in frigid weather without proper clothing, or risk handing the 
suspect a coat that may contain a weapon. See Pet. Br. at 13. Because "common sense 
and ordinary human experience" are the ultimate gauge of reasonableness under the 
Fourth Amendment, however, no such Hobson's choice is mandated here. United States 
v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 683, 685 (1985). 
REPLY TO POINT 1(B) OF DEFENDANT'S BRIEF: POLICE DID 
NOT CREATE THE NEED TO FRISK DEFENDANT'S COAT HERE 
BY REMOVING DEFENDANT OUT-OF-DOORS IN ORDER TO 
SAFELY COMPLETE THE WELFARE CHECK 
Defendant alternatively asserts that it was Officer Billings' "decision to place 
[defendant] outside in the cold weather," that he (defendant) "did not request anything 
from the officer," and that "[i]f there was any need for [defendant] to wear a coat, it was 
due to the fact that Officer Billings created the need to search the coat by forcing 
[defendant] outside and then handing him the coat." Resp. Br. at 12. 
Defendant's claim that police created the need to frisk his coat by unreasonably 
removing defendant out-of-doors for the remainder of the welfare check is raised for the 
first time on certiorari. Defendant did not challenge the propriety of his out-of-doors 
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detention in the court of appeals. Aplt. Br. at 1-6.1 Nor did the court of appeals hold that 
defendant's removal out-of-doors was in any manner improper. Rather, the court of 
appeals reasoned only that the frisk of defendant's coat exceeded the scope of an 
otherwise legitimate Terry frisk. See State v. Peterson, 2003 UT App 300, |13 , 
77 P.3d 646. 
In any event, defendant's suggestion that the police manufactured the need to frisk 
his coat is ultimately belied by the record. The trial court found that defendant's removal 
out-of-doors was eminently justified by the officer's safety concern. See R210:13-14, 51 
("The officer is justified in that totality of circumstances being concerned about his 
person. And stopping the defendant, conducting a Terry frisk and removing him from the 
room is completely consistent with the totality of the circumstances as I see it"). See also 
Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 504 (1983) (plurality) (recognizing that "there are 
undoubtedly reasons of safety and security that would justify moving a suspect from one 
location to another during an investigatory detention"). The trial court also found that 
Officer Billings brought defendant his coat "as a matter of courtesy," while defendant was 
lawfully detained out-of-doors in "really cold" weather. See R210:52, 54. Defendant did 
not challenge these factual findings in trial court. See Aplt. Br. at 1-6; Resp. Br. at 6-14. 
Consequently, it is uncontested that Officer Billings acted out of concern for defendant's 
defendant did orally move the trial court to reconsider its ruling, asserting that 
police had created any exigency, but the trial court summarily denied the motion. See 
R210:53. 
3 
comfort when after legitimately removing defendant from the room, he provided 
defendant with his discarded coat in the "twenty-degree weather." See R210:37. 
Notably, defendant does not dispute that Officer Billings was justified in retrieving 
the syringe once he felt the syringe in picking up defendant's coat. See R210:l 1-14; see 
also Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 375-376 (1993) ("If a police officer lawfully 
pats down a suspect's outer clothing and feels an object whose contour or mass makes its 
identity immediately apparent, there has been no invasion of the suspect's privacy beyond 
that already authorized by the officer's search for weapons," and it may be lawfully 
seized). 
Thus, the only question here is whether the officer's solicitous conduct in 
providing defendant with his coat in the first place violated the Fourth Amendment. The 
answer is clearly no. As set forth above, the "[t]ouchstone of [an] analysis under the 
Fourth Amendment is always 'the reasonableness in all the circumstances of the 
particular government invasion of a citizen's personal security." State v. Warren, 2003 
UT 36, t 31, 78 P.3d 590, (quotation omitted) (brackets added). While "the protection of 
the public might, in the abstract, have been accomplished by 'less intrusive' means," or 
by not providing defendant with his coat even given the extreme weather conditions, the 
humane decision to do so can hardly be described as constitutionally unreasonable. 
Sharpe, 470 U.S. at 687 (quoting Cady v. Domhrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 447 (1973). 
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CONCLUSION 
The court of appeals' rigid and hyper-technical holding—that Officers Billings 
exceeded the scope of a lawful frisk when he courteously attempted to provide defendant 
with his coat for the remainder of his out-of-doors detention—should be reversed and the 
trial court's admissibility ruling should be affirmed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED on J 2 _ November 2004. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
Utah Attorney General 
IARIAN DECKER 
Assistant Attorney General 
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